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Parsing the Mind with Homer
Jonathan B. Holmes
inds are wonderful things. Aside from
all the various goodies they offer in our
daily psychological functioning, such
as thinking, feeling, perceiving, willing and much
more, one major function—parsing—has a difficult
job description.

M

WANTED
A psychological construct to create updated models of reality via the
processing of millions of sensory representations in real time, many times
per second. Though there will never be any guarantee that the various
models of reality will be accurate, the position nonetheless requires the
ability to act on these mental constructions to the benefit of a host organism.
The task of putting together a plausible account of how some aspect of the
universe works is akin to assembling
a jigsaw puzzle where the shape of the
pieces may change depending on one’s
viewpoint. And there is no picture on
the box to serve as a guide.
All kinds of scientific enterprise and
concentrated inquiry pose these sorts of
challenges, but investigations into the
nature of the mind bring an additional
challenge – the job at hand is not just
to parse reality and develop a coherent story, but in effect to “parse the
parser” and develop a coherent story of
its workings. How does one parse the
mind? Do we categorize its functioning as mental or physical? Is it one big
homogenous lump or a heterogeneous
set of distinct abilities or mental faculties? Do we envision its workings to be
like some kind of hydraulic mechanism,
a steam engine, or more like some kind
of information processor, such as a
computer? A large variety of possibilities have been offered over the centuries. Current models of the mind see it
functioning like an information processor with numerous distinct modules
carrying out individual tasks. Faculties
such as thinking, feeling and willing
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are usually understood to be separate
processes, and though a certain degree
of materialism is assumed in many
debates about mental architecture, the
consensus is far from clear on the ontological status of the mind.
A number of years ago I started looking at how one aspect of minds—
consciousness—might operate. By
consciousness, I mean subjective
experience, the ongoing sense of what
it is like to be you. After some time of
being excited by the next new book
promising to explain consciousness,
it became evident that scholars were
in a serious muddle about consciousness, including even how to define the
term. At this point, rather than slogging
through more books on consciousness,
I found myself examining the history
of psychology. The task was to see if
the roots of various current conceptual
difficulties could be found by looking
at the evolution of thinking about the
mind, and if not, to see if something
useful for the debate could be found.
Interestingly, a number of ideas presented themselves from one of the places
where it all began for Western culture,
the ancient Homeric epics, the Iliad and
the Odyssey. Below I provide a glimpse

of what Homeric minds were like and
present some ideas that might be useful
for current psychological debate.

Homeric Psychology 101
In Homer, the most significant terms
for psychological functioning are noos,
thumos, and phrēn or its plural phrenes. A
fourth term, psychē, does not represent
much psychological functioning in
Homer (a bit ironic for the root term
psychology), but the term essentially
referred to the non-cognitive shade that
survived after death. Entire papers and
monographs have been written on each
of these terms, but a quick synopsis of
the first three will suffice here.
Noos is associated with insight or intuition, a clear apprehension of some state
of affairs. It is also associated with mental vision, a kind of mental imagery and
imagination, with a way of thinking
that may be the essential psychological
character of a person or group, and with
a person’s mental essence. At one point
in the Odyssey, Circe turns Odysseus’
crewmates into swine; however, even
though they are now rather different
creatures than they were, they each
retain their noos. By this, they remain,
in a personal psychological sense,
Odysseus’ human crewmates.

Mindbrain (original artwork by the author,
Fall 2012).

Phrēn and its plural phrenes are associated
with cognition and reasoning, a way
of figuring things out if noos was not
able to immediately grasp a situation.
Phrenes also serves as a physical place for
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cognition, around the lungs, and they
serve an important role in language.
When people are deliberating on what
they will say next, they often place this
deliberation in phrenes for consideration.
Thumos also has cognitive aspects, but it
is a more willful and sometimes violent
f lavor of cognition that is also laced
with emotion. It is often the source
of forceful, energetic, emotional and
willful cognition that leads to action.
It is also associated with life itself; as
when people are deprived of their
thumos, they also die. Finally, thumos is
associated with inner dialogue. Such
dialogue often involves some type of
internal conf lict that must be resolved,
such as: should I strive for honor even
though the cost might be great? For
example, when Odysseus is confronted
with an unsettling mass of Trojan war-

Aside from such basic psychological terminology, there are a number of other
details to consider in order to get a better sense of these constructs and their
workings. First, there is no Homeric
term that corresponds to what we mean
by “mind.” Mind, of course, has its
own range of meanings even today,
but the term is used here simply to
refer to that concept, place, or domain
that encapsulates our psychological
structures and processes. The Homeric
mental constructs are not encapsulated
in a single coherent construct, such as
a mind or even a soul, and they are not
in the head. Rather, they are scattered
in the area around the lungs, heart and
diaphragm, areas of the body that could
be referred to as the splanchna, a term
generally meaning “innards” around
the chest and upper abdominal area.

Greek Columns (original artwork by the author, Fall 2012).

riors bearing down on him, his thumos
debates the merits between retreat,
which would carry the associated
assumption of cowardice, or staying to
fight the Trojans despite his tactical
disadvantages. He then goes on to
deliberate this decision in phrenes and
thumos as the Trojan masses approach.
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Thus, there were many “minds” rumbling around in the torso.
Second, the ontological status of these
many minds is unclear at best, and
maybe even incommensurable with
current sensibilities. Some researchers
have variously referred to these things
as mental organs, an odd juxtaposition
to be sure, but one that ref lects the

idea that they may have literally been
conceptualized in some sense as a
combination or blending of the mental
and the physical. To current sensibilities, this may sound odd, though one
must remember that the dualism of a
world made of either mental or material
things did not yet exist.
Third, as can be seen above, each term
has a variety of psychological functions
or associations. This situation, however,
should be viewed carefully, as separating the term into different semantic
categories is a current-day partitioning
of its originally more unified semantic
field. For example, noos may very well
have meant, in a fashion that is difficult
for current sensibilities to fully appreciate, all of those meanings at once.
Finally, there are many overlappings
and functional or categorical blurrings both between and within the
constructs. In one aspect, each psychological term may have a more or
less predominant set of meanings, but
the semantic and functional overlap
between the terms can be very high,
and in some cases the terms seem
almost synonymous. In another, certain
psychological processes that are currently viewed as separate were fused,
such as emotion and cognition, or even
those two plus volition and action.
Thus, you did not just think about
something, rather you thought-felt-willed
something. Again, this is a rather odd
juxtaposition given our current sensibilities. But, perhaps just as oddly, the
system seemed to work, as least as far as
epic poetry went.

Two Possible Thinking
Points for Current Debates
What does one make of all this? First,
it provides a fascinating glimpse into
a long-gone world’s ethnopsychology. But, does it inform any current
debates about mental architecture and
the workings of the mind? A number of
possibilities present themselves, and two
of these are brief ly presented below.
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For one, there is no mind-body problem in Homer. The mind-body problem is a distinct hang-up for explaining
consciousness; how could it be that the
physical brain could possibly create
what seems to be a loftier kind of thing,
namely subjective experience and men-

tightly encapsulated in its own small
domain. The computational theory
of mind, a leading paradigm in mental functioning, is particularly known
for the use of some degree of modular
mental functioning based upon the
f low of information through various

Minds need to be excellent
parsers, categorizers, and
story tellers in order to get
us by in whatever reality we
find ourselves.
tal states? Figuring out exactly how a
non-physical thing could interact with
a physical thing, and vice versa, has
been attempted throughout history by
various thinkers, including Descartes
(who failed), but it is also not just
something of the past. Some researchers
have recently proposed that quantum
interactions at special points in neurons somehow give birth to mental
states from the physical brain. Perhaps
the mind-body problem is based on
assumptions that need some reworking, and the idea that something can be
both physical and non-physical, perhaps
pseudo-physical, provides an interesting
thinking point for such debate.
For another, the idea that a certain
mental construct may have a number
of different functions, overlap some
functions with other mental constructs,
and also combine seemingly disparate
processes such as thinking, feeling, and
willing into an odd-sounding combination or gestalt is very interesting. The
importance here lies in our current
parsings of the mind into distinct faculties, and in some research even into
orthogonal, non-overlapping mental
modules, each with a specific task, each
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modules and processors. Depending
upon how much of the mind is thought
to be modular, this is a very tidy
arrangement, but nature is under no
requirement to be tidy. Stephen Pinker
published a book titled How the Mind
Works (1997) that presents a computational model of the mind that employs a
large degree of mental modularity, even
for higher-level psychological functions. The philosopher of mind Jerry
Fodor was one of the earlier proponents
of the modular mind, though mostly for
lower-level computational processes.
In response to Pinker’s book, Fodor
wrote The Mind Doesn’t Work That Way
(2000), in which he explained why the
computational model of the mind with
such massive modularity is insufficient.
He even gets a bit gloomy at times,
such as when he states that “…what our
cognitive science has found out about
the mind is mostly that we don’t know
how it works.” (p.100).

faculties or mental modules is a bit too
sloppy. For example, there is no a priori
reason that thinking and feeling must
actually be different things, or at least
completely unblended in some way. As
well, there is also no a priori reason why
certain functions of the mind must not
overlap with other functions, producing a bit of mental redundancy and
blending, and thereby, perhaps a more
f lavorful mental experience.

In Conclusion
Aside from presenting a fascinating
window into the mental workings of
Homeric figures, the lack of a mindbody problem as well as the functional
“sloppiness” of Homer’s mental organs
present some interesting thinking
points for current psychology. While
these insights may not be a panacea that
will miraculously resolve serious issues
in current psychology, they do open up
some interesting possibilities to think
outside the current box, as it were, by
looking into a much more ancient box
to inform our current debate.
Additionally, an interesting methodological issue arises when pondering such
things. It makes one wonder a bit about
the mind’s ability to decipher itself.
Minds need to be excellent parsers,
categorizers, and story tellers in order
to get us by in whatever reality we find
ourselves. However, is it possible that
the mind might be a bit parse-happy in
parsing itself? It is always a bit of a trick
to try to measure something with itself.
Jonathan B. Holmes is Associate Professor
in the Department of Psychology.

All this makes one wonder whether
or not the ability of our own minds to
parse the universe and analyze problems into their little bits may need
some reining in. That is, what is logically separable may not be separable in
fact. Thinking about distinct mental
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